Halfway through the year of postgraduate studies that is required for the LLM at Queen's University Belfast, I give a talk to the students, entitled 'Asking the Right Questions: Understanding Methodology.' It is not always particularly well received. On one occasion I was approached by a student afterward, who commented, 'All that "how questions" stuff confused the hell out of me. You should really think about whether we need to know that. Oh, and don't talk about Foucault!' In direct resistance to this comment, let me begin this article with a quotation from Foucault's essay 'What is of methodology -that is, of how to think a project. It is crucial that as researchers we are able to articulate our methodologies. It is also crucial that as educators, we can teach our students why they need to articulate the way in which they think. Can we therefore teach, the article asks, critical legal education? I suggest here that the way to do this is to market
methodology as a 'skill' -and to thereby free it to some extent from what both students and researchers in Law often view as the negative connotations of 'theory'. I begin by addressing the issue of why it is difficult to teach critical legal education. It is necessary then to tackle questions of how to define (alternative) methodology -and how exactly it is different from 'theory' and indeed from 'method'. The second section of the article then presents the need to market methodology as a 'skill' to our law students -as a 'transferrable' skill that translates to the practical workplace and also as a means of seeing alternative truths in the practice and understanding of law and society. It discusses this as a way of hopefully producing a student that is not docile and disengaged (despite being, nevertheless, a successful lawyer) but, rather, is able to nurture an attitude that allows for 'thinking' (law) critically. 3 Kennedy makes a 'utopian proposal' to help reduce illegitimate hierarchy and the feelings of alienation that students feel within Law Schools. 4 My article aims to engage in a slightly different struggle -that of making researchers and educators (and in turn students) think differently about how they teach (and read) law. It perhaps interprets 'critical' too loosely as an 'art of critique' and a certain 'curiosity' -which is an important word, since: be 'critical' in the sense that it employs 'critical judgement… a generic intellectual skill that all researchers are supposed to be able to apply in relation to the object of their research.' 7 Minkkinen points us to an understanding of 'critical' that echoes the association I make with Foucault's 'curiosity'; he uses Habermas to speak of being 'critical' as 'self-reflection', a 'concern with knowledge' that is 'emancipatory':
II. The Difficulty in Teaching Critical
The methodological frame which settles the meaning of the validity of this category of critical statements can be explained in terms of the notion of selfreflection. This frees the subject from dependence on hypostatized forces. Selfreflection is influenced by an emancipatory concern with knowledge ... best supports their way of thinking about their project, and so on. They had no awareness, in other words, of methodology. Moreover, there was not sufficient guidance available for the more curious amongst them that were in fact interested in reflecting on these issues. It was also our experience that staff within Law schools (the researchers and the educators) were often themselves, having been nurtured in a dominantly doctrinal environment, at a loss as to how to explain to students not only the importance of these questions but also how to explain 'methodology'.
In order to substantiate our experiences, we ran two workshops for PhD students (attended mainly by those beginning or at the early stages of study) and consulted numerous scholars across ten partner institutions on a set of materials that eventually were published in a book, what I am calling 'alternative' (i.e. to legal positivism) approaches to law are necessary so that we, and our students, might discover alterative truths about the law and about society.
B. Methodology versus Theory versus Method?
Talking of canons and textbooks as tools for students raises another question: are we factors? In the same way, a postcolonial methodology will use ideas from postcolonial theory -such as challenging the taken for granted assumptions and naturalised categories of knowledge that are produced by the promotion of Western values. 22 The types of generalised questions that are relevant for a postcolonial critique might therefore be: how does the law subordinate or silence peoples from the Global 'South' and 'Third' World?
What violences are hidden by law's claim to race or culture neutrality?
My point here is that methodology is not about 'high theory' -it is not about 'being a theorist'. It is, rather, about using the tools that theory, or different theories, provide to enable one to determine which are the right questions to ask for the particular project one is interested in. So, for instance, one does not need to 'be a Foucauldian' to use ideas of disciplinary power or governmentality to study an aspect of human rights law. Nor does one have to be loyal to only one particular theoretical, or methodological, perspective. It is of course possible to think like a poststructural feminist or to have a methodology that shows you think like a legal positivist, a feminist and a Marxistthough these positions raise inevitable tensions that must be negotiated by the researcher or student. There is the basic and obvious point that one must be true to the idea, to the theory. But I suggest that different theories, or approaches, collectively provide a toolbox of skills that we can take from (as researchers) and teach our students to use (as educators). This is 'not', as Peters states, 'a "shopping-mall approach to 'method'" but a precondition for informed criticism.' 23 There is also a danger, when trying to teach methodology, with using the term 'theory'. Experience shows that it scares off students (and in some cases the educators also!). They associate the term with high theory/philosophy/jurisprudence -and not with a toolbox of ideas that provides them with the skills they need to be successful lawyers.
It is worth noting that as well as a distinction between methodology and theory, a distinction can also be made between methodology and 'method'. I argue that methodology is therefore about 'how to think' a project. This is different to how to think about a project (method). I interpret methodology as a way of thinking, an attitude -it is therefore not as much about theory or method but about an approach, a perspective, or a lens through which to see a project. The reason the methodology is so vital is that it influences the hypothesis, research questions and sources used in a project.
Arriving at one's research questions and 'deciding upon' a methodology is thus a reflexive and circular process, as the diagram below illustrates:
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Methodology thus influences the thesis -i.e. the hypothesis, research questions and method -which in turn directly influences the critical discussion, the sources that will be used, The 'extensions and negations' were so-labeled since they extend or depart from the traditional approaches. They are, in other words, 'alternative'. However, part of what I want to stress in this paper is that this does not make these 'other' approaches to (EU or international or) law any less useful to students (or indeed researchers) than the mainstream or traditional approaches. A mainstream/alternative dichotomy suggests that that which comes under 'alternative' is lesser, or inferior, or lacking in importance. To use Kennedy's word, it is merely 'peripheral'. However, I argue that these alternative approaches present us with the opportunity of alternative truths. They allow us to change the research question of a project depending upon the lens -i.e. the perspective, or methodology -used. I illustrate this below using an example exercise asked of our students. Before that, let me outline an example of an alternative methodology that I have personally found useful, and why. very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population'. Second, governmentality refers to 'the tendency that, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led to the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline and so on) of this type of power, which may be termed "government"'. Third, governmentality is the (result of the) process by which the state gradually 'becomes governmentalized'.
C. Governmentality as an 'Alternative
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to understand that 'governmentality' can be understood as both the process of government (that is, as an 'art of government' itself) 50 and as a methodology (that is, as a 'rationality of government' -a way of thinking about the practice of government, and hence of whom or what is being governed, what governing is, whom or what can govern, and so forth). 51 It is a 'govern/mentality'. 52 I describe governmentality as a methodology to understand various practices and processes in law.
There is a large and growing number of scholars who use a governmentality perspective to understand the ways in which technologies of government operate -for instance in the context of crime control (Garland; Rose -see also Rose and Miller on 'governing communities') 53 , healthcare (Rose) 54 , immigration and asylum (Bigo; Darling; Inda) 55 , eGovernment (Morison), 56 and new governance agencies and human rights (SokhiBulley). 57 What these contributions have in common is the use of governmentality as a methodology -not simply as a 'theory' (which it is not) but as a tool with which to better understand the 'thing' (e.g. interrogating the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act and subsequent developments and presenting the UK border as a site of domopolitics - Excavating modernities'. 59 This illustrates that the label 'alternative' is perhaps limited in its appreciation of the type of literature that does engage with the less mainstream approaches to law -although the question still remains of how we communicate these to our students and this is what I come on to in the next section.
III. Methodology as Skill

A. Methodology and Transferrable Skills
Thus far I have been trying to show that methodology is not just about theory or about method -it is also, and crucially, about a critical attitude. This attitude can be nurtured and disciplined -it can be taught and learned as a skill. Students nowadays want to know what they need to do to gain their degree so that they can go on and practice law. They respond to the language of 'skills'. I teach on a module called Legal Theory and face a constant challenge of having to explain the validity of theory to students, the majority of whom want to qualify as lawyers and practice. It means marketing 'theory' as a 'tool' -as a 'skill'. Similarly, I teach 'methodologies' as one of three 'skills sessions' on the main human rights module for postgraduates studying on the LLM in Human Rights. Without these (albeit brief) sessions, postgraduate students otherwise have no 'formal' exposure to methodologies before going on to write their end of year dissertation.
I use the terminology 'marketing as skills' slightly uneasily because of its management- A 'skill' is literally defined as 'the ability to do something well; expertise'. 62 By learning about (alternative) methodologies, students are becoming experts in how to (better) understand law. They are developing their conceptual (ideas), creative (originality) and critical (evaluation) skills. They are thus gaining the ability to challenge assumptions about the law; to consider alternative questions on a topic of law; they are therefore learning the ability to create alternative truths. Alternative methodologies provide a toolbox of approaches to a problem/research question -the 'tool' may be governmentality, or feminism, or Marxism, etc. The point is that the problem or research question can be approached using tools other than the mainstream approaches. And students should be exposed to all the tools in the toolbox -so they might decide for themselves which is the most appropriate for how they think. Legal research methodologies should thus be taught as a skills or tools within 'a tool-box which others can rummage through to find a tool they can use however they wish in their own area' so that our students might be 'users, not readers.' 63 The question of how this might be useful to the practicing lawyer still remains. Many students view 'law as craft', where 'practical professionalism' is seen as an alternative to adopting an external academic discipline (e.g., economics, sociology, psychology or philosophy). 64 Here I suggest that methodology is practice -as a (critical) attitude, it will influence how you practice the law. How well you are able to identify not only what the law is but to challenge its assumptions and to interrogate them. It means to take on the challenge of not becoming the docile (if still successful) lawyer, as I will explain further below.
B. The critical attitude: searching for alternative truths
The students at the Research Methods workshops were fascinated to discover how the end product of a project can change depending on the questions you ask, so, depending on We conducted a similar exercise with our final year undergraduates at my institution -we asked them to think about writing a feature piece on the 'London Riots' of August 2012, identifying key issues, which we all agreed on as being: race, class, poverty, male, youth and crime. We then asked them to write their piece from a legal positivist perspective, a CRT perspective, a feminist perspective and a Foucauldian perspective and to identify how the approach influences the questions you ask, which influences your research project as a whole. The point is that different perspectives (or methodologies) on a problem/topic create 'alternative truths' about them because they tell the same story in a different way. Many of the students were taken aback by how the story of the riots changed depending on the perspective used. It is an important skill, this article argues, to be able to look at the same things in a different way, in an alternative way, in a more critical way.
C. Moving beyond the docile, successful lawyer
Matthew Ball comments that although it is often argued that law schools provide a negative, competitive, and conservative environment for students, pushing them towards self-interested, vocational concerns, this is nevertheless a productive process. 68 Using
Foucault's work on the government of the self, he argues that far from law students being repressed, they engage in a self-fashioning process that allows them to act effectively as legal personae.
So, perhaps I am wrongly concerned with importance of teaching critical legal education.
Perhaps if the students govern themselves to become successful legal practitioners without reading Foucault or Derrida or Habermas, for instance, we have been successful educators. My problem with this is the resultant docility that governmentality within Law Schools engenders: the docile, successful lawyer that has not been encouraged to 'think about the same things in a different way' or, then in turn, to engage in critique and to resist the dominant paradigm. An awareness of methodology can be in itself a form of 'resistance':
Kennedy uses this idea to argue that educating students on what he calls 'theory' can be used to resist the reproduction of a hierarchy (that already exists in legal education) in the practice of law and in society. What will this resistance achieve? It will hopefully produce better quality work from our students, as they exercise their conceptual, critical and creative skills. It will produce a less docile subject -the student who has the knowledge, who has been 'emancipated' by that knowledge (to use Habermas' wording) and who can therefore say that she does not want to be conditioned to think like that. The student that is not afraid to engage in 'a different form of conduct … wanting to be conducted differently, by other leaders (conducteurs) and other shepherds, towards other objectives and forms of salvation and through other procedures and methods'. 73 These are the alterative procedures, or methodologies, that depart from legal positivism and are all too often removed from legal education. 69 Foucault, above n 50, 201. My emphasis. 70 Ibid. 71 Dagan and Kreitner, above n 64, 10 72 McConville and Chui, above n 27, 5. 73 Foucault, above n 50, 194-5.
IV. Conclusion
